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Abstract
We compare the determinants of individual giving between two countries,
Spain and the US, which differ in their redistribution policies and their beliefs
over the causes of poverty. By varying the information about the determinants
of income, we find that, although overall giving is similar in both countries
when subjects know the actual role of luck and effort, Spanish subjects give
more when they are uninformed compared to American subjects. Using
elicited beliefs, we find that this is due to Spanish subjects associating poverty
with bad luck and Americans believing that low performers did not work hard
enough.
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1. Introduction
Despite abundant interdisciplinary research on the subject, the reasons why individuals
donate a portion of their income, support charities or are in favor of redistributive policies remain
largely unknown. An important piece of the explanation may rely on beliefs regarding how
income inequality is generated. In particular, those who believe economic outcomes mainly
depend on individual effort, may oppose redistribution towards poor individuals, since they may
believe their poverty is due to slacking. On the other hand, those who believe other factors, not
under an individual’s control, are crucial in determining economic outcomes, may be more in
favor of redistribution to the poor, since they may attribute poverty not only to individual
responsibility. In fact, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), Alesina and Glaeser (2004),
Benabou and Tirole (2006) and Fernández (2010) argue that differences in redistributive norms
between the US and Europe are related to differences in perceptions about how income
inequality arises. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) provide a theoretical model suggesting that
Europe has higher redistribution policies than US because Europeans believe that luck and
connections have strong effects on wealth, whereas Americans believe that personal effort
determines wealth.
We study giving and perceptions about the determinants of others’ wealth in a controlled
environment using a laboratory experiment conducted with subjects from the US and from a
representative European country, namely Spain. According to The World Values Survey (1995),
68% of respondents in Spain said “poverty is due to unfair society” while only 16% said
“poverty is due to laziness and lack of willpower.” These results place Spain on the other side of
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the spectrum with respect to the US, where these percentages are 30% and 48%, respectively. 1
Using an experiment in which individual income is partially determined by real effort and
partially by luck, we investigate whether there exist cross-cultural differences in giving between
subjects in these two countries and whether these differences depend on how informed
individuals are about how others’ income has been determined. In particular, using a treatment in
which these factors are unknown, we study whether individual beliefs about the effort levels and
the degree of luck of others differ and, in such case, whether these differences in beliefs explain
differences in voluntary giving. Finally, using individual information on personal characteristics
and values, obtained through a survey, we investigate whether individual giving and beliefs are
related to values, perceptions about inequality and political orientation.
There have been previous research investigating the relationship between the level of
income and giving. This relationship is important since it could be argued that differences in
sharing norms between the US and Spain may be due to inherent differences in wealth. The
evidence is mixed. While Eckel, Grossman and Milano (2007) find a positive relationship,
Auten, Clotfelter and Schmalbek (2000) find a U-shaped relationship between income and
individual giving. Some studies do not find any significant relationship at all (Andreoni and
Vesterlund, 2001; Buckley and Croson, 2006). A recent study by Erkal, Gangadharan and
Nikiforakis (2010) shows that subjects who rank first in a tournament give significantly less than
subjects who rank second in the tournament.2

1

The US and Spain have been the focus of other cross-cultural experimental studies. Alm, Sanchez and De Juan
(1995) find higher tax compliance in US compared to Spain. However, Brandts, Saijo and Schram (2004) do not
find significant differences in contributions to a public good game across the US, Spain, Japan and the Netherlands.
2
Most of these studies involve a small number of subjects interacting with each other. However, the demand for
redistribution in the context of taxation with large groups has also been investigated (Durante and Putterman, 2009;
Ackert et al., 2007; Krawczyk, 2010; Esarey, Salmon and Barrilleaux, 2011; Beckman et al., 2004).
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Most related to our purposes is the relationship between how income is determined and
giving. Hoffman et al. (1994) show that entitlements play an important role in giving decisions.
For example, they use an experiment to show that when agents earn the right to be the dictator,
they give less in the dictator game. Similarly, Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren (2002) and Oxoby
and Spraggon (2008) show that dictators give (take) less when income is earned by the dictators
(recipients) compared to when income is determined by the experimenter.
Our experimental design goes one step further by allowing income to be determined by
two factors, individual (real) effort and luck, and by varying the information subjects have about
such determinants. In most of the previous experimental literature income is randomly
determined by the experimenter or it depends solely on individual effort, while in our experiment
both aspects play a role. Many economic experiments study how individuals give when all
determinants of income are known, see the recent surveys by Andreoni (2006) and Vesterlund
(2006). Konow (2000), Cappelen et al. (2007) and Konow et al. (2009) study different fairness
principles when all determinants of income, such as effort and luck, are known and find that
relative preferences for equity and equality differ across individuals. Most related to our work,
Fong (2001 and 2007) investigate the impact of beliefs on redistributive preferences. In
particular, Fong (2007) studies the determinants of generosity by controlling how much
information subjects have regarding real-life welfare recipients. To our knowledge, our paper
offers the first cross cultural comparison between two countries with opposing beliefs about the
determinants of income, using an experiment in which beliefs about such determinants are
elicited in an incentive compatible manner and in which initial income is determined by a
combination of a real effort task and a random shock.3

3

Ubeda (2010) uses a similar experimental design, although without cross cultural comparisons and only with the
equivalent to our no information treatment, to compare the consistency of different fairness rules.
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In the first stage of our experiment subjects earned their income through a real effort task,
consisting in counting the number of certain specific letters in a fixed number of sequences.
Subjects’ initial income was determined both by the number of individual correct counts (piecerate scheme) and a random number (luck), which took values zero on average.4 The second stage
of the experiment was a two-person distribution decision. A two-person dictator game was used
to elicit preferences for giving (degree of altruism), which govern the tradeoffs that one makes
between his or her own payoffs and the payoffs of others (e.g., Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoffman et
al., 1994; Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fisman et al., 2007). Our
experimental design allows us to answer several interesting questions that the previous papers
fall short off. In particular, we are able to investigate the interaction of effort and luck on
voluntary giving. For example, among others, we can examine whether unlucky individuals get
compensation independently of their effort level or whether individual luck determines giving
towards slackers. In our experiment, we vary the information presented to subjects, i.e. whether
or not subjects could observe how others’ income was determined. The uninformed treatment
allows us to use incentives that elicit individual beliefs about how the income of the other
participant is generated. Finally, at the end of the experiment we conducted a survey on personal
characteristics and values, and perceptions regarding how inequality is generated outside the lab.
Our results indicate that while the overall amount of giving is similar between the two
countries, there exist important cross-cultural differences when subjects are uninformed about
the determinants of others’ income. In the uninformed treatment, Spanish subjects transfer a
larger amount of their income and more frequently than American subjects. Spanish subjects

4

We used a piece rate scheme and a task not depending on cultural differences and/or skill in order to control for
preferences for competition across different cultures and to minimize the role of skill/knowledge on earnings. Some
experiments employ tournaments to determine earnings, or rely on skill or knowledge related tasks (Erkal,
Gangadharan and Nikiforakis, 2010; Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren, 2002).
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give more when they get luckier while Americans do not condition their giving to their own luck
and transfer a flat amount. Regarding beliefs, low performing subjects believe others have more
luck than themselves, partially justifying their poor performance and their scarce altruism.
Additionally, own luck does not bias beliefs regarding others’ luck. Spanish subjects on average
have more accurate and unbiased beliefs about the performance of others. On the other hand,
Americans believe that other subjects did not work hard enough when they observe low
performance, and that other subjects are hardworking when they observe high performance.
Differences in giving behavior are thus consistent with differing beliefs across the two countries.
Regarding the treatment where subjects have information about the determinants of others’
income, we find that in both countries poor subjects receive larger transfers independent of their
effort level, implying that, as expected, low earnings are the driving force behind altruistic
giving. Finally, we show that, proportion of income that comes from own work, importance of
leisure and personal belief on whether effort or luck is more important in determining earnings
affect transfer decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental
design and procedures. Section 3 provides our findings. Section 4 concludes. The Appendices
contain the experimental instructions and the values survey.

2. Experimental Design and Procedures
Ten experimental sessions were conducted at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona,
Spain and University of Michigan, USA.5 A total of 186 subjects participated in the study. The
computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007). All
5

Both universities share similar aspects: they are both one of the largest universities in their countries, and they are
both public schools.
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sessions were conducted by the same bilingual experimenter, who specifically rehearsed to
repeat cultural-free instructions in both countries. Subjects were given the instructions, shown in
Appendix A, at the beginning of the session and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. At
the end of the experiment, subjects were paid in private and in cash.
Experiments were double-blind. Nobody, not even the experimenter, knew how much
each subject earned from the experiment. Subjects earned approximately $20 (15€) on average,
and sessions (including instruction time) lasted approximately 70 minutes. Instructions were
written in English and then translated into Spanish. Two independent assistants translated the
instructions back to English to check for any inconsistencies.
The experimental design consists of two treatments as summarized in Table 1: informed
(INFO) and uninformed (UNINFO). In the first stage of both treatments (the earning stage)
subjects had 30 minutes to count the sum of “a” and “d” characters contained in 50-character
sequences.6 Characters included letters, punctuation marks, numbers, and symbols. Subjects
were told that their earnings (in Tokens) were determined from the sum of the number of correct
counts (effort) and a random number (luck) drawn from a discrete uniform distribution which
could take values -50, -25, 0, +25, or +50.7 Subjects were also told that they could stop counting
characters or take a break whenever they want. At the end of the experiments, subjects’ earnings
were converted to US Dollars or Euros at a conversion rate of 1 Token = $0.15 and 1 Token =
0.1€, which is very close to the currency exchange rate at the time. In the following, all results
will be reported in tokens.
6

There were 300 sequences, which is more than anyone could finish within the allocated time. The task is inspired
by Gneezy and List (2006), who use data entry in a university library. Our task is similar to Abeler et al. (2011),
where subjects had to count the number of zeros in tables that consist of 150 randomly ordered zeros and ones. Such
tasks are mainly effort-related and not skill-related, i.e., success in such a task is mainly attributed to hard work
more than to individual skill.
7
In case the random number was negative and the number of correct counts was less than the absolute value of the
random number, the computer set earnings for the first part to zero.
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In the second stage of the experiment, the redistribution stage, subjects had an
opportunity to redistribute their earnings, determined by their correct number of counts plus their
random number. Subjects were matched in pairs and played a 2-player dictator game. Each
subject received the information about their own number of correct counts in the earning stage
and their own random number drawn by the computer. In the INFO treatment, subjects also
received the same information regarding their matched participant, while in the UNINFO
treatment this information was omitted, such that subjects were only told about the earnings of
their matched participant (i.e., the sum of the random number and number of correct counts). For
each pair, the computer randomly determined which of the two decisions would count to
determine payments.8
Finally, treatment UNINFO contained a third stage, which was not present in the INFO
treatment. In this third stage, we used incentivized elicitation of subjects’ beliefs about the other
subject’s random number, rewarding an exact correct guess with 10 extra tokens.
At the end of the experiment, and while subjects waited to be paid, we used a
questionnaire to elicit self-reported measures about perceptions, personal values and personal
characteristics. The questionnaire is available in Appendix B.

3. Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
We start with descriptive statistics. Table 2 reports the average number of correct counts
in the first stage of the experiment, the average transfer, the percentage of positive transfers and
8

Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) show that in modified dictator games using role uncertainty subjects give more than in
treatments in which the role of dictator is assigned ex-ante. Brandts and Charness (2011) survey the methodological
literature on the strategic method and similar other cost-saving procedures and argue that the evidence against using
them is, at most, mixed. In any case, the cross country comparison should not be affected.
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the average transfer among those who transfer a positive amount. 9 A Mann-Whitney nonparametric test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the average number of correct counts is the
same in any of the two treatments and two countries, confirming the task chosen is not culturally
biased.10 This is not surprising since ex-post all treatments in the first stage are identical.
Looking at individual giving, we again do not observe statistical differences in the
average transfer (2.5 tokens) or in the proportion of positive transfers between the two treatments
(32% and 35%), when taking data from the two countries together.11 However, a pattern emerges
when separating data by country and treatment: while in Spain average transfers and the
proportion of donors is higher in the UNINFO treatment than in the INFO treatment, the opposite
occurs in the US. Spanish subjects increase their average giving from 2.2 to 3.6 (one-tail test, pvalue = 0.06), while Americans (insignificantly) decrease their average giving from 2.8 to 1.8
(one-tail test, p-value = 0.20) between INFO and UNINFO treatments.12 There are no crosscultural differences in average transfers in the INFO treatment (p-value = 0.69). However, there
are differences across countries for the UNINFO treatment. The average transfer in Spain is
significantly higher than the mean transfer in the USA (one-tail test, p-value = 0.03). Regarding
the percentage of individuals who make a positive transfer in the INFO treatment, there is again
no difference in the proportion of positive transfers between American and Spanish subjects
(proportion test, p-value = 0.84). However, in the UNINFO treatment, 27% of subjects in the US
9

Results reported in the paper do not include the two outliers who gave all their earnings, since we suspect that
these two subjects did not understand the instructions. Main findings of the paper are not sensitive to this
elimination.
10
Unless otherwise noted, all reported tests are two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests.
11
The p-value for the difference in average transfers is 0.74, and the p-value for the difference in proportions is 0.38
(one-tail proportion test).
12
We observe an increase in giving by Spanish when subjects are uninformed; even though inequality in earnings
decreased in the UNINFO treatment compared with the INFO treatment (standard deviation of earnings in the
informed treatment is 45, while the standard deviation of earnings in the uninformed treatment is 41). On the
contrary, Americans give less in the UNINFO treatment, even though the standard deviation of earnings is higher in
that treatment (45 compared to 40).
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make a positive transfer, which is significantly lower than the corresponding 44% in Spain (onetail proportion test, p-value = 0.05).13

3.2 Determinants of Giving
Although nonparametric tests give us insights about giving decisions across treatments
and cultures, they are not entirely informative since they do not control for important variables,
such as each individuals’ effort or how the random shock affected each subject. We thus turn to
OLS regression analysis14 to control for these relevant factors in giving decisions. Table 3
regresses the transfer using as regressors the individual number of correct counts (own-effort and
other-effort), each individuals’ random shock (own-luck and other-luck) and, in treatment
UNINFO, the performance of the others (other-performance), since subjects cannot distinguish
between others’ effort and luck.
We start with the INFO treatment. Regression (1) shows the result for both countries
altogether, while regression (2) shows results for Spain and regression (3) for the US. In general,
and as expected, transfers are higher for individuals with higher earnings, i.e., those who work
harder and those who receive a positive random shock. Thus, although not always significant, the
coefficients of own-effort and own-luck are positive. Similarly, those with lower earnings, i.e,
those who either do not work hard and/or receive a negative shock, receive higher transfers. Thus
the coefficients from other-effort and other-luck are negative, although only significantly so for

13

In addition, comparing the INFO and UNINFO treatments for the same country, we see that the proportion of
individuals who make positive transfers increases in Spain and it decreases in the US. These differences are not
statistically significant (one-tail proportion tests, p-value = 0.11 for Spain and p = 0.27 for US).
14
For robustness checks, we also performed Tobit regression analysis since transfers in the INFO and UNINFO
treatments are bounded below by zero. The qualitative results are very similar and are available from authors upon a
request.
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other-effort. Table 3 also contains tests comparing the size of the regressors. We see that othereffort affects giving more than other-luck (p-value = 0.00).15
Regression (2) indicates that, when uniformed, Spanish subjects condition their transfers
on their own luck and the effort of the others. Particularly, the amount of transfer increases in the
extent of own-luck and decreases with other-effort. Intuitively, subjects who benefit from a
positive shock have higher income and tend to share their good luck with others; specifically
those who have lower income, possibly as a consequence of their lower effort. Regression (3)
shows that American subjects only condition their transfers on other-effort. However, when we
run separate regressions to check whether Spanish and American condition their giving
differently, we observe no differences among countries (p-values are all larger than 0.39).16
Finally, for the INFO treatment, we also looked whether there is an interaction between
other subjects’ effort and luck on individual transfer decisions. Using identical regressions as (1)
to (3) in Table 3 and an additional interaction term between other-effort and other-luck we found
no significant interaction effect.17 Therefore, we can conclude that, when informed, subjects
make transfers to those with low effort independent of their random number showing that the
driving force behind giving is low earnings. In fact when we regress transfers on ownperformance and other-performance, we see that transfers significantly increase with ownperformance (p-value=0.02) and significantly decrease with other-performance (0.01).
Another way to see that subjects give more to the individuals with low effort (and hence
do not punish lazy individuals) is to directly look at the summary statistics. Table 4 shows that

15

As we will argue later in the paper, participants give significantly more to subjects with low performance.
Subjects with low effort levels are not penalized.
16
When regressing transfers on a country specific dummy, usa, and interaction of this dummy with all the other
relevant variables such as in Table 3, we find that only own-luck and other-effort significantly affects giving. The
country specific dummy and the interaction terms do not significantly affect giving.
17
The estimation results are available for the authors upon request.
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the transfers in the INFO treatment decrease with other subject’s performance. More
surprisingly, controlling for negative luck, transfers are higher for low effort subjects (one-tail
Mann-Whitney test, p-value = 0.04): an unlucky subject receives 1.36 on average if he puts high
effort, versus he receives 5.52 on average if he puts low effort (one-tail Mann-Whitney test, pvalue = 0.01).
Regressions (4) to (6) in Table 3 include the results for the UNINFO treatment. In the
UNINFO treatment subjects were not informed about others’ number of correct counts or the
result of their random shock, but the result of both things combined. Thus, we use as regressor
other subjects’ earnings (other-performance), which is the result of both. When taking data from
both countries together, regression (4), subjects do not condition their giving on any variable. As
in the INFO treatment, the amount transferred increases in the extent of own-luck for Spanish
subjects, but not for American subjects. Moreover, the coefficients of own-luck and otherperformance have opposite signs and are significantly different among Spanish and American
subjects. Spanish subjects relative to American subjects increase their giving when they receive a
positive shock (p-value = 0.04) and they also increase their giving when others have better
performance (p-value = 0.03). It is interesting to observe that the coefficient of otherperformance is positive for Spanish subjects. In contrary to treatment INFO, the driving force
behind giving is not low earnings. For all subjects, when we regress transfers on ownperformance and other-performance, we find that giving increases with these two factors but the
relationship is not significant at the 10% level (p-values are 0.11 and 0.13 respectively).18
Previous literature on two-person dictator games (Hoffman et al., 1994; Cherry,
Frykblom and Shogren, 2002; Cappelen et al., 2007; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008) suggests that

18

The positive relationship between both giving and own-performance, and giving and other-performance are
significant for Spanish subjects (p-values are 0.06 and 0.05, respectively).
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individuals are more generous when their wealth depends solely on a random shock, which
would explain why Spanish subjects who receive a positive shock increase their giving.
However, while this seems to be true for Spanish subjects for both INFO and UNINFO
treatments, we do not see any evidence on this for American subjects when earnings are
determined partly by effort and partly by luck, especially when American subjects are
uninformed regarding how income of the other participant is generated.
We have seen that the only difference across cultures is for treatment UNINFO, where
subjects are uninformed regarding the effort and luck of the other subject. We investigate
whether this difference is consistent with how individuals form their beliefs.

3.3 Beliefs about Others’ Luck
In treatment UNINFO (after subjects make their giving decisions), we have elicited the
beliefs of subjects regarding the random number of their paired participants. Comparing beliefs
with the actual realization of the random number, we find that on average 50% of subjects guess
the random number correctly (see Figure 1). Moreover, both Spanish and American subjects
have similar accuracy and belief structures. The distributions are not significantly different from
each other (p-value = 0.60), and the average amount of deviation (belief-number) is not
significantly different than zero for both countries (sign-rank tests, p-values are greater than
0.69).
It is interesting to look at the beliefs when other subject’s performance is lower than
average (see Figure 2). Americans predict significantly higher random numbers compared to the
actual values (signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01). This suggests that American subjects believe that
others have low income because they did not work hard enough. This is consistent with the lower
13

proportion of Americans contributing positive amounts in treatment UNINFO. We cannot reject
the null hypothesis that on average Spanish subjects guess correct numbers (signed-rank test, pvalue=0.41).19 Moreover, when comparing Spanish to American subjects, the distributions are
also marginally different (one-tail test, p-value = 0.08).20
Similarly, we look at the cases where other subject’s performance is higher than average
(see Figure 3). In this case we see that histograms are skewed to the left. Americans guess lower
random numbers than actual numbers (signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01). On the other hand,
Spanish subjects guess correct numbers on average (signed-rank test, p-value = 0.27). The
difference in beliefs between American and Spanish subjects is marginally significant (one-tail
test, p-value = 0.10).
Next, we investigate whether the previous result is robust by controlling for effort, luck,
individual perceptions and characteristics. The estimation results are in Table 5. Not surprisingly,
we find strong positive correlation between beliefs and other-performance. This indicates that
when subjects observe higher performance by others, they tend to believe that such high
performance was significantly influenced by luck. Interestingly, beliefs are also significantly
correlated with own-effort. Subjects with lower effort levels guess higher numbers. In other
words, when they see high performance, they tend to believe that luck plays an important role.
In specification (1), we can see that Americans guess higher numbers when they see low
performance but guess lower numbers as other-performance increases (the coefficient of usa is
19

This doesn’t mean that Spanish subjects have accurate beliefs on average in terms of Bayesian updating. Since
every subject may have a different prior on effort distribution, it is not easy to know how Bayesian updating would
result for a given subject. However, on average, we expect Bayesian subjects to guess lower random numbers
compared to true numbers when other’s performance is low.
20
When we regress transfers in the UNINFO treatment on beliefs, effort, luck, and other-performance (clustered at
country level), we observe a weak negative correlation between transfers and beliefs (p-value = 0.14). Although one
would expect to have a more significant effect of beliefs on actions, we have to keep in mind that we have only one
observation per individual so we don’t have controls for individual altruism. Since some people are unconditional
givers and some are purely selfish, it is not that surprising to have a low correlation. We conjecture that one would
observe much higher levels of correlation with more observations per individuals.
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positive but the coefficient of the interaction term is negative). This is especially true for subjects
with low performance, where usa and the interaction term are both significant at the 15% (see
specification 3). Moreover, when we add individual controls (specification 6), these coefficients
are now highly significant for low performers.21

3.4 Personal Characteristics
Before the experiment concluded, subjects answered questions regarding their personal
characteristics, beliefs and perceptions (see Appendix B for the questionnaire).22 We asked
subjects to report how hard they considered they had worked on the real effort task, using a scale
from 1 to 10. Subjects also reported their gender, age, birthplace, income, and what proportion
of that income comes from their own work, as well as their personal values regarding issues such
as family, religion, leisure, work; on political orientation (politics), or government
responsibilities. Finally, subjects were asked about their personal belief whether hardworking
brings success or whether success is a matter of luck and connections.
Table 6 provides summary statistics for each of these variables. Although gender and age
composition of our subject pools are similar, there are several important differences across
cultures which may affect the transfer decisions. We find that Americans report that they are
more religious and they put more importance on leisure time23; they have higher family values
and income (although the proportion of income that comes from work is not significantly
different across cultures). Spanish subjects believe more heavily that hardworking doesn’t bring
21

An interpretation of this finding is that in the USA low performing subjects do not believe high performance is
due to good luck compared with the subjects in Spain. This is consistent with the fact that in the USA, median voter
does not favor high redistribution.
22
Questionnaire data from session 8 of our experiment was lost due to a problem with the server. Thus, this section
only includes data from the remaining sessions.
23
Reporting a higher value for leisure does not necessarily mean Americans enjoy longer leisure time. In contrary,
they may be valuing leisure more if they have (or perceive to have) a lower level of leisure time.
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success and that the government should take more responsibility to ensure everyone is provided
for. Spanish subjects agreed more with the statement “less importance should be placed on work
in our lives.” We also see that Americans report higher numbers than Spanish when they are
asked how hard they worked on the real effort task, even though on average both cultures have
similar correct counts.
We now check whether personal characteristics and values significantly affect how
people decide on their transfers. Table 7 presents the estimation results of several OLS
regressions, where the dependent variable is how much is transferred and the independent
variables are personal characteristics of subjects as well as own-performance and the
performance of the matched subject.24 In treatment INFO, we see that none of these personal
characteristics affect giving at the 5% level. For treatment UNINFO, the proportion of income
that comes from own work positively affects transfers for Spanish subjects (but not for American
subjects). We also see a correlation between giving and leisure. Leisure is a multinomial variable
from 1 to 6 that shows whether individuals find leisure important in their lives, where 1
corresponds to “extremely important.” In general, individuals who find leisure important in their
lives give significantly less. The same result holds for Spanish subjects at the 10% level but not
for Americans. Finally, subjects who agree more with the statement “Hard work doesn’t bring
success – it is more a matter of luck and connections” give more at the 10% level. However, we
do not see any significant correlation when we look at the cultures separately.
We also investigated the determinants of beliefs regarding the random number and found
that in addition to own-effort and other-performance, income levels affect beliefs.25 Specifically,

24

Since, in our experiment, subjects only make one transfer decision, we do not have enough observations, and
therefore these results should be interpreted with caution.
25
The estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
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we found that lower income individuals guess higher numbers. This is intuitive as lower income
individuals may be more likely to associate success with luck.
Since in our study, we also control for the origin of birthplace, we can check whether
subjects with different birth origins behave differently. Even though most of the subjects in
Spain were born in Europe, approximately one-fourth of American subjects were not born in the
US.26 We examine whether these aliens have the same giving norms as the American subjects
that born in the US. We do not find differences in transfers between American subjects that born
in the US and aliens (p-value = 0.27 for treatment INFO and p-value = 0.80 for treatment
UNINFO). Additionally, we do not find any significant differences across the proportion of
positive transfers (proportion tests, p-value = 0.11 for treatment INFO and p-value = 0.38 for
treatment UNINFO). Finally, we do not observe any differences in determinants of giving across
these two groups of American subjects.

4. Conclusion
We study individual giving by subjects whose initial income is determined partially by
real effort and partially by luck. In our experiment we vary the informational conditions by
letting subject know (or not) how others’ income has been determined, i.e., whether others’
income is solely the result of hard work or whether good or bad luck has influenced others’
performance. Our results indicate that transfers decrease with other participant’s effort.
Surprisingly, low effort is not punished: participants with low effort and low luck receive the
largest transfers. However, when subjects are uninformed regarding how the income of the
paired participant is generated, subjects give a flat rate and they do not condition their giving. In
26

Only 5 subjects in Spanish subject pool were not born in Europe versus 23 subjects in American subject pool were
not born in the US.
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the uninformed treatment we observe cross-cultural differences. Spanish subjects are more
generous, and they give more frequently compared to American subjects. This difference may be
due to different beliefs. While Spanish subjects have more accurate beliefs, Americans believe
that others did not work hard enough when they see low performance. The latter finding provides
a direct (incentivized) support for the 1995 World Values Survey which documents that 48% of
Americans and only 16% of Spanish believe that “poverty is due to laziness and lack of
willpower.”
Our study also increases our understanding regarding different fairness ideals such as
strict egalitarianism, libertarians and liberal egalitarians (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007;
Konow et al., 2009). While strict egalitarians consider equal sharing a fair distribution,
libertarians oppose redistribution and liberal egalitarians believe individuals should not be held
responsible for circumstances beyond their control. As in Cappelen et al. (2007, 2011), in a twoperson dictator game, we find evidence for liberal egalitarianism for European subjects, i.e.,
Spanish subjects condition their giving on own-luck, but not on own-effort.27 In contrast, we find
that American subjects do not condition their giving neither on own-luck, nor on own-effort.
American subjects, who give, seem to be unconditional givers.
Finally, our study helps to shed light on why previous studies do not always agree on
what is the relationship between the level of income and giving, i.e. positive, negative or none
(Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Buckley and Croson, 2006; Eckel, Grossman and Milano,
2007; Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis, 2010). In particular, the results of our experiment
suggest that the uncertainty regarding how income is generated and cultural differences affect the
relationship between income and transfers.

27

Cappelen et al. (2007) conducted their experiment in Norway, while Cappelen et al. (2011) conducted their webbased experiment in Norway, Germany, Uganda and Tanzania.

18

References
Abeler, J., Falk, A., GÄotte, L., and Huffman, D. (2011) “Reference Points and Effort Provision.”
American Economic Review,101(2), 470-492.
Ackert, L. F., Martinez-Vazquez, J., Rider, M. (2007) “Social Preferences and Tax Policy Design:
Some Experimental Evidence.” Economic Inquiry, 45, 3, 487-501.
Alesina, Alberto F. and Edward L. Glaeser (2004) Fighting poverty in the U.S. and Europe: A
world of difference. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
Alesina, Alberto F. and G. M. Angeletos (2005) “Fairness and Redistribution." American
Economic Review, 95(4): 960-980.
Alesina, Alberto F., Glaeser, Edward L. and Sacerdote, Bruce (2001) “Why Doesn't the US Have a
European-Style Welfare System?” NBER Working Paper No. W8524. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=286196
Alm, J. Sanchez, I. and De Juan, A. (1995) “Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax
Compliance.” Kyklos, 48, 3-18.
Alm, James and Benno Torgler (2006) “Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States
and in Europe.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 27, 224-246.
Andreoni, James & Vesterlund, Lise (2001) "Which Is The Fair Sex? Gender Differences In
Altruism." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 293-312.
Andreoni, James (2006) “Philanthropy.” Handbook of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism,
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1201-1269.
Andreoni, James and James Miller (2002) “Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test
of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism." Econometrica, 70 (2): 737-753.
Auten Gerald E., Sieg, Holger and Charles T. Clotfelter (2002) “Charitable Giving, Income and
Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data.” American Economic Review, 92(1): 371-382.
Auten, G. E., Clotfelter, C., & Schmalbeck, R. L. (2000) Taxes and philanthropy among the
wealthy. In J. Slemrod (Ed.), “Does atlas shrug? The economic consequences of taxing the
rich” (pp. 392–424). New York and Cambridge, MA: Russell Sage and Harvard University
Press.
Beckman, S., Formby J.P., Smith, W. J. (2004) “Efficiency, Equity and Democracy: Experimental
Evidence on Koun’s Leaky Bucket,” in Cowell, F., Inequality, Welfare and Income
Distribution: Experimental Approaches, JAI Press.
Benabou, Richard and Jean Tirole (2006) "Belief In A Just World And Redistributive Politics."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 699-746.
Brandts, J., Charness, G., (2011) “The Strategy versus the Direct-Response Method: a First Survey
of Experimental Comparisons.” Experimental Economics, 14(3): 375-398.
Brandts, Jordi, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, & Arthur Schram, (2004) "How Universal is Behavior? A Four
Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms."
Public Choice, 119, 381-424.
Buckley, Edward & Croson, Rachel, (2006) "Income and wealth heterogeneity in the voluntary
provision of linear public goods." Journal of Public Economics, 90(4-5), 935-955.
Cappelen, A.W., A.D. Hole, E. Sorensen and B. Tungodden (2011) “The Pluralism of Fairness
Ideals: An Experimental Approach.” Journal of the European Economic Association,
forthcoming.
Cappelen, A.W., K. Moene, E. Sorensen and B. Tungodden (2007). “Needs vs entitlements - an
international fairness experiment.” American Economics Review, 97, 3, 818-827.
19

Charness, Gary, and Matthew Rabin (2002) “Understanding social preferences with simple
tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117: 817–69.
Cherry, T. L., P. Frykblom and J. F. Shogren (2002) “Hardnose the Dictator.” American Economic
Review 92(4): 1218-1221.
Durante, R., and L. Putterman (2009) “Preferences for Redistribution and Perception of Fairness:
An Experimental Study.” Working paper.
Eckel, Catherine C., Philip J. Grossman and Angela Milano (2007) “Is More Information Always
Better? And Experimental Study of Charitable Giving and Hurricane Katrina.” Southern
Economic Journal, 74(2): 388-411.
Erkal, Nisvan, Gangadharan, Lata, and Nikos Nikiforakis (2010) “Relative Earnings and Giving
in a Real-Effort Experiment.” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Esarey, Justin, Tim Salmon, and Charless Barrilleaux (2011) “Social Insurance and Income
Redistribution in a Laboratory Experiment.” Political Research Quarterly, XX(X) 1-14.
Fernández, Raquel (2010). “Does Culture Matter?”. IZA Discussion Paper N. 5122.
Fischbacher, Urs (2007) "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments."
Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171-178.
Fisman, Raymond, Kariv, Shachar, and Daniel Markovits (2007) “Individual Preferences for
Giving.” American Economic Review, 97(5): 1858-1876.
Fong, Christina (2001) “Social Preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution.”
Journal of Public Economics, 82: 225-246.
Fong, Christina (2007) “Evidence From an Experiment on Charity to Welfare Recipients:
Reciprocity, Altruism and the Empathic Responsiveness Hypothesis.” Economic Journal,
1008-1024.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N. E. and Sefton, M. (1994) “Fairness in Simple Bargaining
Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 347-369.
Gneezy, U and J. List (2006) “Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Field Evidence on Gift
Exchange.” Econometrica, 74(5) 1365-1384.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Vernon Smith (1994) “Preference, Property Rights
and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior, 7: 346-380.
Iriberri, N., Rey-Biel, P. (2011) “The Role of Role Uncertainty in Modified Dictator Games.”
Experimental Economics, 2, 160-180.
Konow, J., Saijo T. and Kenju A. (2009) “Morals and Mores: Experimental Evidence on Equity
and Equality.” Working paper.
Konow, James (2000) “Accountability and Cognitive Dissonance in Allocation Decisions”
American Economics Review, 90, 4, 1072-1091.
Krawczyk, M. (2010) “A Glimpse through the Veil of Ignorance: Equality of Opportunity and
Support for Redistribution.” Journal of Public Economics, 94(1-2), 131-141.
Oxoby, Robert J. & Spraggon, John (2008) "Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games."
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65(3-4), 703-713.
Ubeda, Paloma (2010) “The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study.” Discussion
Papers in Economic Behaviour 10/10. University of Valencia.
Vesterlund, Lise (2006) “Why do People Give?” in Richard Steinberg and Walter W. Powell eds.,
The Nonprofit Sector, 2nd edition, Yale Press.

20

Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary of Treatments
Treatment

Information about the Opponent’s
Effort
Earnings
Luck

INFO

Yes

Yes

Yes

UNINFO

No

No

Yes

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (Averages by Treatment)
Average
Number of
Correct Counts
Observations
99
INFO
79.5 (19.3)
87
UNINFO
80.0 (15.2)
INFO
54
81.6 (16.7)
UNINFO
36
77.8 (14.3)
45
77.4 (21.9)
INFO
51
81.5 (15.7)
UNINFO
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
Treatment

Average Transfer
(Amount Sent)

Percentage of
positive transfers

2.5 (5.6)
2.5 (4.9)
2.2 (5.7)
3.6 (5.5)
2.8 (5.6)
1.8 (4.3)

32%
35%
31%
44%
33%
27%

Average Positive
Transfer
(Amount sent)
7.8 (7.6)
7.3 (6.0)
7.1 (8.4)
8.1 (5.7)
8.5 (6.9)
6.4 (6.4)

Table 3: Transfers Conditional on Effort and/or Luck (OLS)
Treatment
Country
Dependent variable,
transfer
own-effort
own-luck
other-effort
other-luck

All

INFO
Spain

US

All

UNINFO
Spain

US

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.03
(0.03)
0.02*
(0.01)
-0.11***
(0.03)
-0.02
(0.01)

0.02
(0.04)
0.04**
(0.02)
-0.12***
(0.04)
-0.03
(0.02)

0.03
(0.04)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.09**
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.02)

0.02
(0.04)
0.02
(0.01)

-0.00
(0.06)
0.05**
(0.02)

0.04
(0.04)
-0.01
(0.02)

0.02
(0.01)
-0.94
(3.19)
87
p-value
0.99

0.04*
(0.02)
-0.54
(5.54)
36
p-value
0.44

-0.01
(0.02)
-0.80
(3.65)
51
p-value
0.24

other-performance
constant

8.90**
10.84**
7.38
(3.46)
(5.24)
(5.51)
Observations
99
54
45
Hypothesis
p-value
p-value
p-value
own-effort = own-luck
0.89
0.68
0.63
other-effort = other-luck
0.00***
0.05**
0.05**
own-effort = - other-effort
0.06*
0.10
0.41
own-luck = - other-luck
0.85
0.71
0.96
Note: * indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. ** significant at 5%; and *** at 1%.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Population
ALL
ALL
Spain
Spain
US
US

Table 4: Conditional Transfers in Treatment INFO
Number of obs.
Mean transfer
Standard dev.
Median transfer
Min transfer
Max transfer
Average Payoff

other-effort ≥ 80
other-luck > 0
17
1.06
2.68
0
0
10
141.71

other-effort < 80
other-luck > 0
24
1.96
3.03
0
0
10
118.88

other-effort ≥ 80
other-luck ≤ 0
33
1.36
3.82
0
0
16
64.42

other-effort < 80
other-luck ≤ 0
25
5.52
9.14
0
0
32
39.48

Table 5: Beliefs Conditional on Effort and/or Luck
Own-Performance
Dependent variable,
belief
usa

All

ownperfor ≥
80

ownperfor <
80

All

ownperfor ≥
80

ownperfor <
80

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

6.65
-2.88
24.31
15.36*
1.09
(8.16)
(10.76)
(14.47)
(8.74)
(13.95)
own-effort
-0.52*** -0.61*** -0.36** -0.46*** -0.58**
(0.11)
(0.20)
(0.16)
(0.12)
(0.27)
own-luck
-0.02
0.08
0.05
-0.01
0.14
(0.04)
(0.14)
(0.16)
(0.05)
(0.16)
other-performance
0.72*** 0.66*** 0.87*** 0.75***
0.69***
(0.07)
(0.08)
(0.13)
(0.07)
(0.10)
other-performance × usa
-0.07
0.01
-0.24
-0.07
0.03
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.15)
(0.09)
(0.16)
Observations
87
47
40
87
47
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.
Standard errors are in parentheses.

41.50**
(16.22)
-0.37**
(0.17)
0.00
(0.18)
0.89***
(0.14)
-0.32*
(0.16)
40

Table 6: Summary Statistics on Personal Characteristics/Views
Country

Spain
US
Mann-Whitney test
Mean
Min Max
Mean
Min Max
p-value
hard
5.89 (1.83)
1
9
8.09 (2.02)
1
10
0.00***
female
0.52 (0.50)
0
1
0.49 (0.50)
0
1
0.65
age
21.71 (2.93) 18
32
21.41 (3.43) 18
43
0.28
income
1.50 (0.69)
1
3
1.79 (0.80)
1
3
0.01**
proportion
2.63 (1.34)
1
4
2.52 (1.34)
1
4
0.57
family
2.13 (0.88)
1
5
1.83 (1.08)
1
5
0.00***
religion
5.30 (1.20)
1
6
3.93 (1.69)
1
6
0.00***
leisure
2.66 (0.77)
1
5
2.40 (1.00)
1
6
0.03**
politics
2.94 (1.24)
1
7
3.20 (1.23)
1
6
0.16
work
3.20 (1.32)
1
7
3.62 (1.32)
1
6
0.02**
luck
3.79 (1.43)
1
7
4.71 (1.49)
1
7
0.00***
government
2.58 (1.44)
1
7
3.17 (1.54)
1
7
0.00***
birthplace
7.78 (1.53)
1
10
2.37 (2.41)
1
10
0.00***
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.
Standard deviation in parentheses. Spain has 90 and US has 86 data points.
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Table 7: Transfers Conditional on Personal Characteristics
Treatment
Country
Dependent variable,
transfer
performance

ALL

INFO
Spain

US

ALL

UNINFO
Spain

US

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.02*
0.03
0.00
0.02*
0.02
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.03)
other-performance
-0.04***
-0.05***
-0.03
0.02
0.07**
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.03)
hard
-0.14
-0.14
-0.05
0.17
0.61
(0.29)
(0.46)
(0.45)
(0.25)
(0.63)
female
-2.03
-1.98
-2.89
0.10
1.73
(1.27)
(1.91)
(1.96)
(1.17)
(2.15)
age
0.03
-0.01
-0.24
-0.17
-0.41
(0.25)
(0.32)
(0.57)
(0.17)
(0.47)
income
-0.06
0.46
1.26
-0.43
-3.89
(0.81)
(1.42)
(1.15)
(0.78)
(2.81)
proportion
-0.64
-1.53*
1.16*
0.73*
1.94**
(0.46)
(0.77)
(0.66)
(0.41)
(0.82)
family
-0.05
-0.75
0.98
-0.88
0.12
(0.67)
(1.00)
(1.10)
(0.67)
(1.30)
religion
0.39
0.11
0.29
-0.05
-0.71
(0.45)
(0.85)
(0.55)
(0.36)
(1.09)
leisure
-0.25
-0.65
-0.58
1.46**
2.81*
(0.78)
(1.37)
(1.12)
(0.62)
(1.38)
politics
-0.21
-0.45
-0.09
-0.39
0.12
(0.53)
(0.77)
(0.86)
(0.58)
(1.06)
work
0.64
0.37
1.23
0.04
0.14
(0.51)
(0.76)
(0.91)
(0.41)
(0.95)
luck
0.27
0.34
-0.59
-0.74*
-1.57
(0.42)
(0.60)
(0.94)
(0.39)
(0.92)
government
-0.34
-0.38
-0.43
0.14
1.04
(0.40)
(0.63)
(0.57)
(0.48)
(1.00)
constant
3.64
12.23
5.04
1.99
-1.03
(8.14)
(11.26)
(18.68)
(5.55)
(16.86)
Observations
89
54
35
87
36
R-squared
0.20
0.31
0.46
0.19
0.51
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 10% level, ** at 5%; and *** at 1%.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.

23

0.01
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
0.25
(0.35)
-0.92
(1.97)
-0.03
(0.20)
0.37
(0.96)
0.38
(0.55)
-0.91
(0.85)
-0.15
(0.49)
0.95
(0.80)
-1.06
(0.91)
-0.19
(0.62)
-0.44
(0.48)
0.27
(0.65)
3.62
(7.04)
51
0.14

Figure 1: Accuracy of Beliefs

Figure 2: Accuracy of Beliefs Conditional on Low Performance
(other-performance < 80)

Figure 3: Accuracy of Beliefs Conditional on High Performance
(other-performance > 80)
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Appendix A - Instructions for the UNINFO Treatment
Below you can find the instructions for the treatment with no information regarding the
determinants of others’ income. Instructions for the treatment with information are identical with
the exception that the screen in Part II containing information about the other subjects’ earnings
also includes the number of correct answer and the random number of the paired subject.
Instructions for the treatment with information did not contain a Part III of the experiment, where
beliefs were elicited.
General Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. Several research agencies have provided funds for this
research. Please make sure your cell phones are turned off to avoid interruptions during the proceedings.
This experiment deals with individual decision making. Your participation in this experiment is voluntary. As you
know, you will be compensated for your participation; if you read the instructions carefully, you can, depending on
yours and other participants’ decisions, earn a considerable amount of money in addition to the $7 participation fee.
The currency used in the experiment is tokens. Tokens will be converted to US dollars at a rate of 1 token to 0.15
US dollars.
The experiment consists of two parts. You will be provided with instructions for Part I of the experiment. After Part
I of the experiment is over, you will be provided with instructions for Part II. While you wait to be paid, you will be
asked to fill out a questionnaire.
In our experiment, all records will be linked to an anonymous subject ID. At the end of the experiment, you will be
paid privately and anonymously. The experimenter will get help from one of her assistants to distribute the
payments. The assistant does not know which ID belongs to which participant. The assistant will place the earnings
of participants in envelopes with matching ID numbers. After closing the envelopes, the assistant will pass the
envelopes to the experimenter. Therefore, nobody, not even the experimenter, will be able to link your decisions to
your name during or after the experiment.
Please do not communicate with the other participants during the experiments. Should you have any questions,
please raise your hand. At the end of the experiment we will call you, one at a time, to pay you in private.
Pre-instructions
In the first part of this experiment you will be asked to count the sum of “a” and “d” characters in 50-character
sequences. Characters include letters, punctuation marks, numbers, and symbols. Below we provide some examples.
Please make sure you understand how we have calculated the sum of “a” and “d” characters in each sequence.
sequence #

50-characters sequence

1
2
3
4

aaaaaaaaadddaaaaaddaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
7po6df^gaips78fadfsdfs&fsdasdftyhgdua*gfrtg(tratra
p0=jsjd8fjaalkjdflkjds890aaaaaaaatrhtr-taatrgtaaaa
Las9-fakjasklfjalsdjlkjaakljalksaljl=-ddt+gtraaart

total number of “a”
and “d” characters
50
12
19
14

Before we start, you will now go through a practice round. Although your final earnings do not depend on the
number of correct counts in this practice round, you should try to correctly count all sequences to get practice. We
ask you to input into the computer the sum of “a” and “d” characters beside each sequence number, as shown in the
following figure.
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When you finish, the computer will display the correct sum of “a” and “d” characters next to each sequence. If all
your answers are correct, both columns should be the same.
Even if you use the following page to make notes, please remember to input each number in the computer as soon as
you have calculated it.
Instructions Part I
In this Part I of the experiment, you will be provided with 300 character sequences. During 30 minutes you will be
asked to count the sum of “a” and “d” characters in each sequence. Your earnings from Part I will depend on your
result. Your result will be computed by adding a random number X to the number of your correct counts:
(your result) = (your number of correct counts) + (your random number X)
where your random number X is randomly drawn by the computer and it can be either -50, -25, 0, +25, or +50. Each
of these numbers is equally likely to be drawn and may differ for each participant. At the end of this part the
computer will make one separate and independent random draw for each participant.
For example, if you correctly count the sum “a” and “d” characters in 82 sequences and the random number X
selected by the computer is -25, your result will be 57=(82-25), while if the random number selected by the
computer is +50 your result will be 132= (82+50). Numbers in this example are just for illustrative purposes and do
not intend to indicate how the computer will choose the random number.
After the 30 minutes of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw your random number X and will calculate
your result based on your random number and your number of correct counts. Then the computer will calculate
earnings of each participant. Your earnings from Part I are calculated by multiplying your result by 1 token:
(your earnings in Part I) = (your result *1 token)
Note: if your random number is negative and the number of correct counts is less than your random number then
your result will be negative. In such a case, the computer will set your earnings for this part of the experiment to
zero.
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You will have 30 minutes to count the sum of “a” and “d” characters in the 300 sequences we will show you. In any
case, you can stop counting characters whenever you want and you do not have to continue until the end. What we
ask you is to keep quite during the 30 minutes. In case you decide to take a break, we have left some newspapers for
you to read (you are also allowed to take books and lecture notes and read).
The sentences are provided in paper sheets. You are allowed to use a pen. However, you are asked to enter the sum
of “a” and “d” letters before the 30 minutes end to be able to get your earnings.
Please wait until the experimenter gives the start sign.
Instructions Part II
In this Part II of the experiment you are randomly paired with another participant. To preserve anonymity, neither of
you will ever learn with whom you are paired with.
At the beginning of Part II, the computer will display your number of correct counts, your random number
(which the computer randomly drew from -50, -25, 0, +25, or +50), and your result in Part I. Remember, the result
from Part I is:
(your result) = (your number of correct counts) + (your random number X)
Finally, the computer will display your earnings. Remember, earnings from Part I are calculated by multiplying
your result by 1 token:
(your earnings in Part I) = (your result) * (1 token)
The computer will also display the result, and the earnings in Part I of your paired participant. The computer
WILL NOT show you the number of correct answer or the random number of your paired participant.
Remember that your paired participant’s random number may be different from your random number since the
computer makes two separate random draws: one for you and one for your paired participant.
An example of the display screen is shown below:
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Once the computer displays the screen above, you will make a decision on how much you would like to transfer
from your earnings to the other participant’s earnings. You will be able to transfer any amount you like. For
example, suppose your earnings from Part I is 100 tokens and if the other participant’s earnings is 120 tokens. If you
enter a transfer of 15 your final earnings will be 85 (=100-15), and the other participant’s final earnings will be 135
(=120+15).
Numbers in this example are just for illustrative purposes and do not intend to indicate how you should make your
decisions.
Although both you and your paired participant will make the transfer decisions, the computer will randomly
implement only one decision made by either you or your paired participant. However, you will not know whose
decision will be implemented until the end of the experiment. Since your decision is implemented with 50%
probability, you should pay careful attention to the transfer decision you make.
To summarize, if your decision is randomly picked, then your transfer will decrease your earnings and it will
increase your paired participant’s earnings. However, you will not get anything from your paired participant’s
transfer since his/her decision is not implemented. Similarly, if your paired participant’s decision is randomly
picked, his/her transfer will increase your earnings, and it will decrease his/her earnings. However, you will not
transfer anything to your paired participant since your decision is not implemented.
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the total amount of your final income in private and in cash.
In our experiment, all records will be linked to an anonymous subject ID. At the end of the experiment, you will be
paid privately and anonymously. The experimenter will get help from one of her assistants to distribute the
payments. The assistant does not know which ID belongs to which participant. The assistant will place the earnings
of participants in envelopes with matching ID numbers. After closing the envelopes, the assistant will pass the
envelopes to the experimenter. Therefore, nobody, not even the experimenter, be able to link your decisions to your
name during or after the experiment.
Part III (only for the UNINFO treatment)
In the screen you just saw, the computer only showed you the result and the earnings in Part I of your paired
participant. The computer did not show you the random number of your paired participant.
In this Part II we ask you to make a prediction about the random number of your paired participant. If your guessing
is correct you will receive 10 extra experimental points which will add up to your final earnings. If your prediction is
not correct you will not earn any additional point.
Remember that your paired participant’s random number can be different from yours since the computer chooses
them independently among -50, -25, 0, +25 or +50.
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Appendix B - Questionnaire
In order to finish the experiment, and while we calculate your earnings, please fill in the following
questionnaire:
Part 1
1. How hard did you work in the first part of the experiment in a scale from 1 to 10?
a. 1
b. 2
c. 3
d. 4
e. 5
f. 6
g. 7
h. 8
i. 9
j. 10
2.

How did you decide how much to transfer in the experiment?

Part 2
1.

Gender
a. male
b. female

2.

Age

3.

Average Monthly Income (including all income sources such as parent’s expenses for you)
a. less than $500
b. between $500-1000
c. more than $1000

4.

What proportion of your income comes from your own work
a. less than 20%
b. between 20% and 50%
c. between 50% and 70%
d. all or almost all

5.

What is the importance of family in your life:
a. extremely important
b. very important
c. important
d. somewhat important
e. not very important
f. not important at all

6.

What is the importance of religion in your life:
a. extremely important
b. very important
c. important
d. somewhat important
e. not very important
f. not important at all
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7.

What is the importance of leisure time in your life:
a. extremely important
b. very important
c. important
d. somewhat important
e. not very important
f. not important at all

8.

In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale,
generally speaking?
a. extreme left
b. left
c. left-center
d. center
e. right-center
f. right
g. extreme right

9.

Please tell us whether you think the following change is desirable: “Less importance placed on work in our
lives”
a. extremely desirable
b. very desirable
c. desirable
d. indifferent
e. not very desirable
f. undesirable
g. extremely undesirable

10. How would you place your views on this: “Hard work doesn´t bring success - it´s more a matter of luck and
connections”
a. I completely agree
b. I agree most of the times
c. I agree
d. I am indifferent
e. I disagree
f. I disagree most of the times
g. I completely disagree
11. How would you place your views on this: “The government should take more responsibility to ensure that
everyone is provided for”
a. I completely agree
b. I agree most of the times
c. I agree
d. I am indifferent
e. I disagree
f. I disagree most of the times
g. I completely disagree
12. In what country or region were you born?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

North America
Central/South America
Australia/ New Zealand
Other Pacific Nation
South-East Asia
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f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.

South Asia
Other Asia
Western Europe
Northern Europe
Eastern Europe
Africa
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